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either temporary or final cessation of operations to invoke the sixty-
day period of grace, the court, by inference, may have settled a
related problem. The usual sixty-day provision in the commence and
the continuous clauses now appears automatically to extend the lease
for a like period of time. Previously there had been some adherence
to the theory that "the lease terminates upon cessation of production
or drilling activity only to be revived by later conduct required by
lessee within this period." 1
A major problem remains: What will be the attitude of Texas
courts towards leases dissimilar to those in both Reid and Harris?"
Since the constructions given the clauses in both cases are valid, the
possibility of Harris overruling Reid is eliminated. It is apparent how-
ever, that the Reid case will continue to create difficulty for the
lessee within the scope of its fact situation. On the other hand, Skelly
Oil Co. v. Harris seems to have opened the door to more liberal
judicial interpretation in permitting a contractual clause to span the
gap between completion and actual or constructive production of a
well. This result suggests that when possible, Texas courts probably
will be inclined to construe the clauses to include such an extension
period; but absent a direct precedent, the attorney cannot be certain
on which side of the fence the clause will fall.
Richard M. Hull
The Dissenting Shareholder: Appraisal and Other Rights
Under the Texas Business Corporation Act
Plaintiff owned less than twenty per cent of the outstanding stock
in several affiliated corporations. In accordance with the provisions of
the Texas Business Corporation Act,1 Defendants, as officers, direc-
tors, and stockholders holding more than eighty per cent of the out-
standing voting shares of those corporations, voted to sell all the
"' See Comment, Extending the Texas Oil and Gas Lease by the Habendum, Dry Hole,
and Shut-In Royalty Clauses, 14 Sw. L.J. 365, 387 (1960), where the author states:
These cases [Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 161 Tex. 88, 337 S.W.2d 267 (1960);
Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 Tex. 278, 171 S.W.2d 339 (1943);
Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref.
n.r.e.] evolve the interesting question of whether the usual sixty-day period
of the continuous and commence clauses operate to extend the lease auto-
matically for this limited period of time regardless of whether there is a
resumption of the required activity before the end of this period, or whether
the lease terminates upon the cessation of production or drilling activity
only to be revived by later conduct required by the lease within this period.
The answer to this question remains speculative.
aaSee Discussion Notes, 15 Oil & Gas Rep. 659 (1961).
See Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.10 (1956).
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corporate assets to newly formed corporations owned entirely by
them. Plaintiff was not afforded an opportunity to secure stock in
the purchasing entities; however, Plaintiff's proportionate share' of
the proceeds from the sale of the assets of the old corporations' was
deposited in escrow for his benefit. Plaintiff sued for damages for
conspiracy to defraud, and in the alternative, for payment of the
appraised value of his shares." No appraiser was appointed. At the
trial, the jury found the value of Plaintiff's stock to be 312,000
dollars and also assessed 54,000 dollars in damages on the fraud
allegation. The court of civil appeals affirmed judgment for the
damages for fraud but held that the valuation procedures were im-
proper and reduced the judgment accordingly! The supreme court
indicated that damages could be awarded in addition to statutory
appraisal rights if necessary to effect a full recovery by a dissenting
minority shareholder but held: (1) A sale of corporate assets pur-
suant to statutory authorization, although effecting a "freeze out"
of a minority shareholder, is not a fraudulent action that will sup-
port an award of special damages in addition to statutory appraisal
rights. (2) In an action for appraisal rights, the appointment of an
appraiser is not jurisdictional and may be waived by a defendant's
failure to insist upon such appointment by a plea in abatement.
Farnsworth v. Massey. - Tex. -, 365 S.W.2d 1 (1963).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS
At common law, as a general rule, affirmative action by one share-
holder can prevent the sale of all or substantially all of the assets
of a corporation.' This rule is based upon the theory that an implied
contract exists among the shareholders to pursue the purpose for
which the corporation was originally chartered.! Also, there is a
strong public policy against "corporate suicide."' An exception to
2 Plaintiff's proportional share amounted to $151,529.27.
a The court referred to the respective corporations as "old" and "new," the latter indi-
cating the newly formed corporations. These marks of identification are employed hereafter.
'See Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.12 (1956) which provides that a minority share-
holder who dissents from a merger, consolidation, or sale of substantially all the assets, may
receive from the corporation the fair value of his shares. Since an impartial appraiser usually
determines "fair value," the provision is said to create "appraisal rights."
5353 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). The judgment for Plaintiff was reduced to
$205,529.27. This amount equalled the $151,529.27 set aside by Defendants as Plaintiff's
share of the proceeds from the sale of the assets, plus the $54,000 fraud damages found by
the jury. The court found that the valuation of the shares by the jury was improper because
the appointment of an appraiser was jurisdictional and could not be waived.
'Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 So. 589 (1908); Myerhoff v. Bankers Sec., Inc., 105
N.J. Eq. 76, 147 Atl. 105 (Ch. 1929); Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401 (Ch. 1853).
' Small v. Minneapolis Electro-Matrix Co., 45 Minn. 264, 47 N.W. 797 (1891); Kean
v. Johnson, supra note 6; 58 Colum. L. Rev. 251, 252 (1958).
'People v. Ballard, 134 N.Y. 269, 32 N.E. 54 (1892); 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 881 (1930).
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the general rule applies if the corporation is insolvent and is not
affected with a public interest.! In addition to his ability to enjoin
a sale of all corporate assets for lack of unanimous consent, the
minority shareholder has other common law rights and remedies.
For example, an ultra vires transaction can be enjoined;10 and when
a consolidation is not approved by all stockholders, the dissenting
shareholder can recover from the consolidated company the value of
his equitable interest in the corporate property. A conversion theory
has been used in special instances to give the dissenting stockholder
an action against the purchaser of the corporation's assets for the
value of his shares." Moreover, the minority shareholder can enjoin
or set aside a fraudulent or illegal transaction, 13 or an unfair con-
tract entered into by the corporation with an officer or director."
The right of a dissenting shareholder to a valuation of and pay-
ment for his shares is a legislative innovation. One of its purposes
is to nullify the troublesome common law rule that gives one dis-
senting shareholder the ability to enjoin or set aside a corporate
reorganization desired by the majority." The older approach often
was intolerable since it led to "strike suits" in which a minority
stockholder sought to be paid a handsome sum merely for his agree-
ment to settle. The newer appraisal right, in this respect, affords
protection to the minority by permitting an independent valuation
of and payment for their shares, and at the same time, it promotes
corporate flexibility by permitting the majority to carry out their
plans." Today, all but two of the American jurisdictions provide
for these rights. 7 Although seven states" purport not to allow that
'See Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921).
"Country Club v. McLaughlin, 300 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
"Lauman v. Lebannon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42 (1858); International & G.N. Ry. v.
Bremond, 53 Tex. 96 (1880). See also 46 Calif. L. Rev. 283 (1958).
"Ely v. Credit Mens Adjustment & Interchange Bureau, Inc., 106 N.J. Eq. 472, 151
At. 208 (Ch. 1930); Wunsch v. Consolidated Laundry Co., 116 Wash. 44, 198 Pac. 383
(1921). See also 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1132 (1959).
"Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 106 N.E.2d 848 (Il1. App. 1952); Opelka v. Quincy
Memorial Bridge Co., 82 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ill. App. 1948).
4 Zorn v. Brooks, 125 Tex. 614, 83 S.W.2d 949, 951 (1935).
15 See Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 So. 589 (1908); Myerhoff v. Bankers Sec., Inc.,
105 N.J. Eq. 76, 147 Atl. 105 (Ch. 1929); Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401 (Ch. 1853).
See also 58 Colum. L. Rev. 251-53 (1958).
"See Anderson v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 295 N.Y. 343, 67 N.E.2d
573 (1946); Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.C. 141, 69 S.E.2d 585 (1952). See also Lattin,
Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 233, 236
(1931).
"T Utah and West Virginia do not have statutes permitting the valuation action. For a
complete collection of the state statutes, see Skoler, Some Observations on the Scope of
Appraisal Statutes, 13 Bus. Law. 240, 249-53 (1958).
"s California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, Puerto Rico.
See 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1132 (1959).
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remedy when a reorganization is consummated by the sale of cor-
porate assets, appraisal rights may still be upheld on the theory that
the sale of assets constitutes a "de facto" merger. 9
II. EFFECT OF APPRAISAL ON OTHER RIGHTS
Whether the statutory appraisal rights preclude the use of com-
mon law remedies by a minority shareholder is a question answered
by statute in some jurisdictions and by court decision in others. A
few states expressly preserve the non-statutory equitable remedies;2
0
others provide only that the statutory appraisal rights are not ex-
clusive" or else sanction the injunction actions as alternatives to the
statutory rights;"2 still others deny the equitable relief on the ground
that the appraisal right is an adequate legal remedy." When the
matter of the exclusiveness of the appraisal right has been left to the
courts, some have held that the equitable relief is barred." Apparently,
the rationale is that a shareholder's financial interest in the corpora-
tion is all that merits protection, i.e., he has no vested right to con-
tinue in the particular business." However, some of the more recent
opinions recognize that although the exclusiveness rule provides cor-
porate flexibility, it nevertheless paves the way for "freeze outs," and
the purchase of corporate assets and appropriation of the business
by the majority become relatively simple.6 In fact, the modern
trend does not favor exclusiveness of appraisal rights when equity
should otherwise take jurisdiction, for example, when the transaction
is ultra vires," illegal," or fraudulent." One theory offered in support
"See Troupiansky v. Henry Disston & Sons, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa. 1957),
discussed in Note, 46 Calif. L. Rev. 283 (1958). But see Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.,
- Del. -, 188 A.2d 123 (1963).
"North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-113(c) (1960); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. 5
13-85 (1954).
"'Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. § 271.415(4)(b) (1960); Maine: Me. Rev, Stat. Ann. ch.
53, S 85 (1954).
22Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 106 N.E.2d 848 (111. App. 1952); Opelka v. Quincy
Memorial Bridge Co., 82 N.E.2d 184 (Ill. App. 1948). See also Petty v. Harwood Elec.
Co., 280 Pa. 142, 124 At. 302 (1924). But see Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.C. 141, 69
S.E.2d 585 (1952).
"sKatz v. R. Hoe & Co., 99 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1950), modified, 227 App. Div.
966, 99 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1950).
'" Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
Blumner v. Federated Dept. Stores, 99 N.Y.S.2d 691, 694 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Beloff v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949).
"Beachwood Sec. Corp. v. Associated Oil Co., 104 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1939).
"Even if the injunction is denied, liability for breach of a fiduciary relation or fraud
might be imposed. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); Fletcher, Cor-
porations § 7296, at 569 (1961). The court in the instant case, in denying Plaintiff's claim
for special damages based upon the alleged "freeze out," states that the transaction is
"one which the law permits." 365 S.W.2d at 5.
2 Johnson v. Spartanburg County Fair Ass'n, 210 S.C. 56, 41 S.E.2d 599 (1947).
"Opelka v. Quincy Memorial Bridge Co., 82 N.E.2d 184 (Ill. App. 1948).
"1Weckler v. Valley City Mill Co., 93 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Mich. 1950); Robb v.
Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 106 N.E.2d 848 (Ill. App. 1952).
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of the trend is that the purported corporate sale is void when fraud
or illegality is involved, and hence, the appraisal statutes have no
application." Of course, there is a better justification for denying
the exclusiveness of the appraisal technique when the corporation is
insolvent: The legal remedy of appraisal then becomes inadequate,
and equity jurisdiction attaches.31 Thus, absent express statutory
provisions regarding exclusiveness, most courts hold that appraisal
rights are the exclusive remedy only when the transaction is con-
summated in good faith and meets all of the specified requirements."
The Texas act, in an express provision regarding exclusiveness of
appraisal rights, somewhat ambiguously states:
Nothing contained in part Five of this Act [which authorizes ma-
jority action with appraisal rights for dissenters] shall ever be con-
strued as . . . abridging any right or rights of a dissenting stockholder
under existing laws. 3
Quite obviously, under the statute, appraisal rights are not exclusive.
However, many problems arise in determining what other rights a
dissenting minority shareholder may have. The plaintiff in the instant
case sought special damages for an alleged conspiracy to defraud him
of his shares as an alternative to appraisal rights. The court, in
dictum, stated that special damages, if necessary to effect a full
recovery, could be awarded in addition to the appraised "fair value"
of the shares." The court pointed out that such additional recovery
would be justified, for example, if the fraud or unfair dealing of the
majority depressed the value of the shares prior to a sale of the
assets and thus made the appraised value inadequate.
There is certainly no indication that the court in its dictum in
Farnsworth intended to render an exhaustive interpretation of the
Texas appraisal rights statute. Many questions remain unanswered.
For example, can the provision be construed to allow an initial
"election" of whether to proceed under the act or to assert common
30 Weckler v. Valley City Mill Co., supra note 29; Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., supra
note 29; Opelka v. Quincy Memorial Bridge Co., 82 N.E.2d 184 (Il. App. 1948); Wick v.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 188 N.E. 514 (Ohio App. 1932).
" Brown v. Ramsdell, 227 App. Div. 224, 237 N.Y. Supp. 573 (1929).
"2See Stauffer v, Standard Brands, Inc., - Del. -, 187 A.2d 78 (1962). However,
Ballantine states that, in the absence of express limitation, the statutory remedy of appraisal
rights is generally held to be only an alternative to other equitable or legal remedies. Bal-
lantine, Corporations § 298, at 703 (1946). See also Henn, Corporations § 349, at 553
(1961); Lattin, A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1165, 1168-73, 1187(1940).
' Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.14 (1956). It is noteworthy that article 5.14 was
added by floor amendment and was not part of the draft submitted by the Bar Committee.
See Comment of Bar Committee, 3A Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. Stat. 276 (1956).
3 365 S.W.2d at 5.
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law rights?"s In view of the wording of the statute, such a con-
struction would be possible. However, that interpretation would
conflict with two of the basic purposes of appraisal rights, viz., the
elimination of "strike suits" and the promotion of corporate flexi-
bility.
Another problem is whether the express preservation of "rights"
under existing law impliedly excludes the preservation of "remedies."
The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius may support
such a construction. Thus, injunctive relief, which is technically a
remedy, could be denied on this basis. Some courts have reached this
result by finding an adequate legal remedy available in the form
of appraisal rights." It would seem then that appraisal rights would
usually be "adequate" in Texas, especially since a claim for special
damages is recognized when necessary to effect a full recovery. Under
this approach, only when the corporation is insolvent, and statutory
rights are obviously inadequate," or when the transaction lacks
statutory authorization 9 or the required shareholder approval,"0
should the injunction still be available.
A final consideration is whether the Texas statute should be con-
strued as merely a savings clause designed to preserve accrued rights,
i.e., only those rights that arose prior to the date the act became
effective. That was the position taken by the court of civil appeals"'
in the instant case as well as the interpretation given by the Texas
State Bar Committee. However, there was an implication in the
principal case that the article was not to be so limited. In the example
given by the court regarding preservation of the action for special
damages, there was no indication that the measure of such damages
should be limited to the date the act was adopted by the corpora-
tion. Thus, when the provision refers to rights under "existing"
laws, it apparently means the rights existing at common law and
not the time of accrual of such rights.
"5The court in the instant case declared it was not concerned with this point, 365
S.W.2d at 5. In the opinion after the motion for rehearing, the court stated that it "did
not hold that a dissenting stockholder is deprived . . . of his common law remedies and
under proper facts could not originally proceed other than by the statutory 'fair value'
remedy." 365 S.W.2d at 5, 6.
"The expression of one excludes all others, i.e., if remedies were intended to be pre-
served they would have been listed. See State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 141 Tex. 643, 175
S.W.2d 238 (1943); Siebert v. Richardson, 86 Tex. 295, 24 S.W. 261 (1893).
87 See Katz v. R. Hoe & Co., 99 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 277 App. Div.
966, 99 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1950).
aBrown v. Ramsdell, 227 App. Div. 224, 237 N.Y. Supp. 573 (1929).
"gSee Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 306 N.Y. 58, 115 N.E.2d 652 (1953).
4"See Matter of MacDonald, 205 App. Div. 579, 199 N.Y.S. 873 (1923).
4' 353 S.W.2d 262, 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
" See Comment of Bar Committee, 3A Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. Stat. 276 (1956).
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III. THE FARNSWORTH CASE
The rationes decidendi of Fansworth v. Massey are twofold: (1)
that the appointment of an appraiser is not jurisdictional; and (2)
that a properly authorized reorganization is not to be considered a
fraud on a minority shareholder even though it effects a "freeze
out" of his interest. The first appears sound. Generally any failure
by the shareholder in following the prescribed dissent procedures
will result in his being bound by the corporate action.43 However,
since the appraiser is to be appointed by the court, this should not
be considered as a step to be taken by a shareholder in his dissent.
Defendant-corporations desiring determination of "fair value"" by
an appraiser in preference to some other method can protect them-
selves by filing a plea in abatement, as indicated by the court." One
disadvantage of this holding should be pointed out: In the normal
appraisal action, waiver of the appointment of an appraiser may
work to the disadvantage of the dissenting shareholder." An ap-
praiser is presumably sophisticated in financial matters and is able
to evaluate objectively certain relevant factors, e.g., capitalization
of earnings. In contrast, few juries understand these concepts, and,
unfortunately, the dissenting stockholder's attorney may overlook
such complex rudiments of the evaluation process. At that point,
"fair value" will lose all objective meaning and become subjectively
related to the sophistication of the attorney and his ability to convey
the knowledge he has to the jury.
The holding that a properly authorized "freeze out" is not
actionable fraud may be too broad for general application. To a
certain extent, majority stockholders stand in a fiduciary relation
toward the interest of the minority. 7 They must exercise fairness and
good faith in effecting a reorganization so as not to acquire the
business for themselves in breach of their fiduciary duties.' Plaintiff,
4 Root v. York Corp., 56 F. Supp. 288 (D. Del. 1944).
" For a good treatment of how the valuation is made, see Comment, Valuation of Dis-
senting Stockholder's Shares Under an Appraisal Statute, 23 Mo. L. Rev. 223 (1958). See
also Comment, Corporations-Appraisal Statutes-Elements in Valuation of Corporate Stock,
55 Mich. L. Rev. 689 (1957).
45 365 S.W.2d at 4.
46 Also, when many dissenting shareholders are involved, the appraisal action somewhat
resembles a class action in that one consolidated proceeding determines the "fair value" of all
dissenters' shares and the final judgment binds all shareholders having notice of the pro-
ceeding. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.12(B) (1956). Thus, the situation could arise
in which an active dissenter could effectively waive the rights of the non-litigating dis-
senters to the appointment of an appraiser.
4"Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483
(1919), modifying 244 Fed. 61 (2d Cir. 1917); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36
(3d Cir. 1947); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 675 (1942).
4 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, supra note 47.
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